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Effectively Curbing the GST
Exemption for Perpetual Trusts
By Lawrence W. Waggoner
In 1986 Congress passed the federal generation-
skipping transfer tax as a supplement to the federal
estate and gift taxes. The purpose was to ensure that
accumulations of great wealth are taxed at least
once a generation. The GST tax, however, allows an
exemption. For a married couple, the ceiling on the
exemption, originally set at $2 million, is now
$10.24 million; for one individual, the ceiling is half
that amount. Congress did not impose a federal
durational limit on trusts that qualify for the GST
exemption, but most states had viable perpetuity
laws that limited the life of the trust. The absence of
a time limit on the GST exemption provided an
incentive for banks and the estate-planning bar to
lobby their state legislatures to pass laws allowing
trusts to last forever or for several centuries. The
lobbying efforts proved successful in many states.
The result is that trusts can now be exempt from
GST tax for much longer than Congress originally
intended. Moreover, those trusts can have as many
as 450 living beneficiaries 150 years after creation,
more than 7,000 living beneficiaries after 250 years,
and more than 114,000 living beneficiaries after 350
years.1 After 175 years, the settlor’s genetic relation-
ship to all his then-living beneficiaries will drop
below 1 percent, and as the trust presses on into the
more distant future, the settlor’s genetic relation-
ship to the beneficiaries will decline further as the
trust benefits ever more remote relatives.2
Congress should close the loophole in the GST
exemption by imposing a federal durational limit
on trusts that qualify for the exemption. Treasury
agrees but proposes a remedy that would leave
many trusts and much wealth perpetually exempt.
The proposal advanced here would not do that and
therefore is more consistent with the original pur-
pose of the GST tax and its exemption.
The proposal would give the GST exemption
only to a trust that limits its term to one of three
alternative periods, each of which has a foundation
in perpetuity law: (1) 21 years after the death of a
life in being; (2) 90 years after creation; or (3) after
the death of the last living beneficiary who is no
more than two generations younger than the settlor,
with special rules for cases in which a beneficiary’s
share is distributable on reaching the specified age
of 30 or younger and for trusts whose sole current
beneficiary is a named great-grandchild. Congress
1See 3 Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative
Transfers 554-556 (2011) (hereinafter Property Restatement);
Lawrence W. Waggoner, ‘‘From Here to Eternity: The Folly of
Perpetual Trusts,’’ Univ. Mich. Pub. Law & Legal Theory
Working Paper No. 259 (2012), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1975117.
2See supra note 1.
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Current law allows a married couple to transfer
up to $10.24 million into a trust that is exempt from
the federal generation-skipping transfer tax. The
proposal would deny the GST exemption prospec-
tively, unless the trust must terminate within one of
three perpetuity periods: (1) 21 years after the death
of a life in being; (2) 90 years after creation; or (3)
after the death of the last living beneficiary who is
no more than two generations younger than the
settlor. A trust now in existence would be allowed a
grace period during which it could be modified to
terminate within the allowed period, but absent
modification, the trust would lose its GST exemp-
tion at the end of the grace period.
The proposal is offered as a part of the Shelf
Project, a collaboration of tax professionals to
develop proposals raising revenue while making
the tax system more efficient and reducing
deadweight loss. The inventory of the prior 64
shelf projects is found at http://www.utexas.edu/
law/faculty/calvinjohnson/shelf_project_inventory
_subject_matter.pdf. Shelf projects follow the
format of a congressional taxwriting committee
report in explaining current law, what is wrong
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should allow the trust settlor to select which period
is most reasonable to the needs of the trust. The
settlor, however, would have to select one of the
alternatives beforehand and could not, for instance,
choose termination at the last (or second-to-last)
period to expire.
For perpetual trusts that were established before
the effective date and therefore have already quali-
fied for the GST exemption, the proposal would
give the trust a post-enactment grace period, say of
six months or perhaps of a year, during which the
terms of the trust could be modified to terminate
within one of the three permitted periods. Modifi-
cation could be achieved judicially under existing
case law or under statutory law that is already
enacted or could be promptly enacted. Or, modifi-
cation could be achieved privately by the exercise of
trustee or trust-protector powers that many per-
petual trusts already contain. Any trust not so
modified during the grace period would lose its
GST exemption and pay appropriate GST tax on
any generation-skipping transfer occurring after the
grace period expires. It is anticipated that trusts
would avoid future GST tax by complying with the
new requirement.
A. Current Law
The GST tax, enacted in 1986, imposes a flat tax at
the highest federal estate tax rate on generation-
skipping transfers.3 The purpose of the GST tax is to
ensure that property is taxed every time it shifts
from generation to generation or skips a generation.
The GST tax applies to three types of generation-
skipping transfers (unless exempted): taxable termi-
nations, taxable distributions, and direct skips.4 In
general, a taxable termination occurs when an in-
terest in trust property terminates, unless immedi-
ately after the termination a non-skip person has an
interest in the property or unless at no time after the
termination may a distribution be made from the
trust to a skip person. A taxable distribution occurs
when income or principal is distributed from a trust
to a skip person. A direct skip occurs when an
interest in property is transferred to a skip person in
a manner that is subject to the federal gift tax or
federal estate tax.5 A skip person is defined as (1) a
natural person assigned to a generation that is two
or more generations below the generation assign-
ment of the transferor or (2) a trust if all interests in
the trust are held by skip persons or if there is no
person holding an interest in the trust and at no
time after the transfer may a distribution be made
from the trust to a non-skip person.6
The GST exemption allows settlors to create trusts
that are exempt from the GST tax. As of 2012, the
ceiling on the exemption is $5.12 million (twice that
for a married couple). The ceiling was set at $5 mil-
lion in 2010 to be the same as the estate and gift tax
exemption. The increase to $5.12 million resulted
from an inflation adjustment that took effect at the
beginning of 2012. The current GST exemption and
estate tax exemption sunset at the end of 2012. In the
absence of additional action by Congress, the GST
exemption ceiling drops in 2013 to $1 million.7 A
GST-exempt trust retains its exemption no matter
how much the trust’s post-creation value appreciates
above the maximum exemption amount. It is now
well documented that various estate-planning tech-
niques can be used to leverage the amount exempted
beyond the exemption’s ceiling.8
B. Reasons for Change
1. Explosive growth of perpetual trusts. Before the
passage of the GST tax and GST exemption in 1986,
the wealthy had little incentive and probably little
desire to establish perpetual trusts, even though
they were permitted to do so under the laws of
Idaho, South Dakota, and Wisconsin.9 Passage of
the GST tax with an exemption for trusts of any
duration gave settlors an incentive to create trusts
of perpetual or very long duration. When Congress
granted the exemption, it did not impose a dura-
tional limit on exempt trusts, relying on state per-
petuity laws to supply that limit. The reliance on
state perpetuity laws was badly misplaced. At the
instigation of state banking groups and estate-
planning attorneys, states began to pass legislation
allowing transferors to create perpetual trusts —






7See Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of
2001, P.L. 107-16, section 901, as modified by Tax Relief, Unem-
ployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of
2010, P.L. 111-312, section 101(a)(1).
8See Ray D. Madoff, Immortality and the Law: The Rising Power
of the American Dead, 62-63 (2010); Iris J. Goodwin, ‘‘How the
Rich Stay Rich: Using a Family Trust Company to Secure a
Family Fortune,’’ 40 Seton Hall L. Rev. 467, 492 (2010).
9See Max M. Schanzenbach and Robert H. Sitkoff, ‘‘Perpetu-
ities or Taxes? Explaining the Rise of the Perpetual Trust,’’ 27
Cardozo L. Rev. 2465, 2466-2468 (2006).
10One thousand years in Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming; 500
years in Arizona; 365 years in Nevada; 360 years in Alabama,
Florida, and Tennessee.
11Alaska, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Idaho, Illinois,
Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hamp-
shire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Virginia, and Wisconsin.
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Congress and state legislative bodies have there-
fore combined to set the perpetual-trust movement
in motion. Although Congress did not intend to do
so, whereas the state legislative bodies acted delib-
erately, the primary responsibility still rests with
Congress. Because it created, albeit inadvertently, a
tax advantage for trusts that can remain tax exempt
for centuries, Congress is the legislative body that
facilitated the movement.
Because Congress has not yet acted to rectify its
mistake, the perpetual-trust movement is in full
flower. With state perpetuity laws out of the way,
the wealthy are creating perpetual trusts in signifi-
cant numbers.12 An empirical study found that
roughly $100 billion in trust assets had flowed into
states allowing perpetual trusts.13 The study was
based on data through 2003 from the annual reports
that institutional trustees file with federal banking
authorities. Considerably more wealth has un-
doubtedly moved into those states since 2003.14
Moreover, the $100 billion figure undercounts the
actual value of trust assets flowing into those states,
because the sources on which the study was based
were reports from federal regulatory agencies.15
Those reports contain no data on trusts in which the
trustee is a family trust company, organized under
state law for the limited purpose of administering
trusts of one family. Family trust companies, which
are becoming popular vehicles for administering
perpetual trusts of the very wealthy,16 are regulated
if at all by state law,17 not federal law, and conse-
quently do not report to federal agencies.
2. Treasury’s partially ineffective proposal. As part
of the Obama administration’s fiscal 2013 revenue
proposals, Treasury stated its position that the ab-
sence of a durational limit on the GST exemption is
inconsistent with the purpose of the exemption and
undermines the policy of the GST tax,18 but its
proposed solution would not end the perpetual-
trust movement or its associated perpetual GST
exemption. For perpetual trusts created before en-
actment, the Treasury proposal would allow them
to continue to be unburdened by a durational limit.
For perpetual trusts created after the effective date
of enactment, the Treasury proposal would still
allow them to qualify for the GST exemption but
would have the exemption expire 90 years after the
trust was created.
If Congress were to enact the Treasury proposal,
the reaction would be predictable:
a. Pre-effective-date trusts. For previously estab-
lished pre-effective-date GST-exempt perpetual
trusts, no action would be required. They would be
safe.
For perpetual trusts not yet established, the rush
would be on to beat the deadline once the effective
date became known to the estate planning bar. The
rush would actually start earlier, once the estate
planning bar discovered that the Treasury proposal
12Charitable trusts, by contrast, have traditionally been al-
lowed to operate in perpetuity (and many do), but charitable
trusts are subject to two safeguards that make the perpetuity
tolerable: (1) the public benefit standard and (2) judicial modi-
fication under cy pres when circumstances cause the settlor’s
design to become outmoded. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts,
section 28 (2003).
13See Robert H. Sitkoff and Max Schanzenbach, ‘‘Jurisdic-
tional Competition for Trust Funds: An Empirical Analysis of
Perpetuities and Taxes,’’ 115 Yale L.J. 356, 410 (2005). The study
found that the states that attracted the most perpetual-trust
business were those that do not tax trust income produced by
funds originating from out of state. Id. States that levy an
income tax on trust funds attracted from out of state experi-
enced no observable increase in trust business. Id. at 420.
The $100 billion trust figure did not represent the value of
GST-exempt perpetual trusts. It appears that the payoff for
institutional trustees operating in perpetual-trust states is that
‘‘high net worth clients’’ create perpetual trusts up to the GST
tax exemption limit and also move the greater bulk of their
wealth into nonexempt trusts with the same institutional
trustee. See Madoff, supra note 8, at 80-82 (noting that ‘‘Congress
created a marketing bonanza for banks and trust companies’’
and that perpetual trusts have ‘‘been tremendously profitable
for banks and other financial service companies, which can
generate large fees administering these long term trusts’’).
14Writing in 2011, the year after Congress raised the exemp-
tion to $5 million, Michael Graetz noted that the increase
prompted the wealthy to move even more assets into perpetual
trusts: ‘‘I know of more than $1 billion in New York City alone.’’
Michael J. Graetz, ‘‘The Politics and Policy of the Estate Tax:
Past, Present, and Future,’’ Yale Law & Economics Research
Paper No. 425, at 11 (2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1755161. From 1990 to 1991,
Graetz served as Treasury deputy assistant secretary for tax
policy.
15See Sitkoff and Schanzenbach, supra note 13, at 387-388.
16See Goodwin, supra note 8, at 467-468 (noting that family
trust companies are generally thought to be appropriate only for
families with a net worth of at least $200 million). See also Alan
V. Ytterberg and James P. Weller, ‘‘Managing Family Wealth
Through a Private Trust Company,’’ 36 ACTEC L.J. 623, 631-632
(2010).
17See Goodwin, supra note 8, at 474-475 (noting that family
trust companies are lightly regulated by state law in some states
and unregulated by state law in other states).
18Treasury Department, ‘‘General Explanations of the Ad-
ministration’s Fiscal Year 2013 Revenue Proposals’’ 81-82 (Feb.
2012), Doc 2012-2947, 2012 TNT 30-32.
Treasury took the same position in its 2012 revenue pro-
posals. See Treasury Department, ‘‘General Explanations of the
Administration’s Fiscal Year 2012 Revenue Proposals,’’ 129-130
(Feb. 2011), Doc 2011-3155, 2011 TNT 31-21; Joint Committee on
Taxation, ‘‘Description of Revenue Provisions Contained in the
President’s Fiscal Year 2012 Budget Proposal,’’ JCS-3-2011, at 525
(June 2011), Doc 2011-13010, 2011 TNT 115-14.
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was likely to become law.19 Super-rich clients who
were on the fence would be encouraged to establish
GST-exempt perpetual trusts before the door closed
on the opportunity.
b. Post-effective-date trusts. For post-effective-
date GST-exempt perpetual trusts, generation-
skipping transfers would not be taxable for 90
years. Settlors therefore would have several op-
tions.
To be certain that the GST tax would never apply,
some post-effective-date trusts might be crafted to
terminate on or shortly before expiration of the
90-year period.
Some and maybe most post-effective-date GST-
exempt trusts likely would take a different form.
Ninety years is a very long time. The whole tax
system might change during the next few years, let
alone the next 90. Some and maybe most post-
effective-date trusts might therefore be crafted with
no termination date but with trustee or trust-
protector powers that would enable the trustee or
the trust protector to adjust the terms of the trust to
take account of tax law as it changes over time.20
The trustee’s or trust protector’s powers could take
different forms, but the idea would be that if the
GST tax and the 90-year limit were still in effect as
the trust neared its nine-decade mark, the trustee or
trust protector would then have the option of
avoiding GST tax by terminating the trust and
distributing the assets on or shortly before expira-
tion of the 90-year limit.21
The Treasury proposal, if adopted, would
dampen the perpetual-trust movement and its as-
sociated perpetual GST exemption, but it would
leave many trusts and much wealth exempt from
GST tax for much longer than Congress originally
intended.
C. Proposed: An Effective Solution
A solution that would truly end the perpetual-
trust movement and its associated perpetual GST
exemption (let us call it the Effective Solution)
would impose a reasonable duration for trusts
eligible for a GST exemption for both new and
existing trusts.
1. New trusts. For trusts created after the effective
date, the Effective Solution would deny the exemp-
tion for any perpetual trust. For that purpose, a
perpetual trust would be defined as a trust con-
trolled by the law of a state or other jurisdiction that
allows perpetual trusts,22 except that such a trust
would not be a perpetual trust if its terms require
the trust to terminate within the perpetuity period
defined by the GST exemption. The perpetuity
period for the exemption would be defined as (1) 21
years after the death of a life in being; (2) 90 years
after creation; or (3) the death of the last living
beneficiary who is no more than two generations
younger than the settlor,23 with special rules for
cases in which the share of a beneficiary is distrib-
utable on reaching the specified age of 30 or
younger24 and for trusts whose sole current benefi-
ciary is a named great-grandchild.25 The settlor
19Word would spread quickly through the estate planning
bar and through the listservs and websites of various organiza-
tions, such as the American College of Trust and Estate Counsel
and the Real Property Probate and Trust Law Section of the
American Bar Association.
20The Property Restatement provides that a donative docu-
ment may be modified, in a manner that does not violate the
donor’s probable intention, to achieve the donor’s tax objectives.
See Property Restatement, supra note 1, at section 12.2 (2003). This
provision of the Property Restatement is codified in the Uniform
Trust Code and in the Uniform Probate Code. See Uniform Trust
Code section 416; Uniform Probate Code section 2-806. See also
Restatement (Third) of Trusts, section 66 (2003) (Power of Court to
Modify: Unanticipated Circumstances).
Although these tax-modification sections contemplate judi-
cial action, they could be adapted to a private trust to grant the
trustee power to modify the terms of the trust without judicial
approval. See also Restatement (Third) of Trusts, section 64 (2003)
(Termination or Modification by Trustee, Beneficiary, or Third
Party). If the Treasury proposal were to become law, Treasury
regulations should provide that any modification after the
expiration of the 90-year period would be ineffective to avoid
GST tax.
21If the GST tax were repealed before the 90 years is up, the
trust could continue for centuries, although repeal of the GST
tax would remove the tax-motivated purpose of the trust in the
first place and Congress’s interest in the perpetual-trust move-
ment.
22For a list of jurisdictions allowing perpetual trusts, see
supra notes 10 and 11.
23Generations would be counted according to current law,
section 2651. For support of a two-generation limit, see 3
Property Restatement, supra note 1, at 568; Waggoner, ‘‘U.S.
Perpetual Trusts,’’ 127 Law Q. Rev. 423, 430-431 (2011); Ray D.
Madoff, ‘‘America Builds an Aristocracy,’’ The New York Times,
July 12, 2010, at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/20
10/07/12/opinion/12madoff.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=madoff%2
C+america+builds+an+aristocracy&st=nyt (‘‘Congress could fix
the problem by limiting the generation-skipping-transfer
exemption to trusts that last no longer than two generations’’);
Jane Bryant Quinn, ‘‘Estate Taxes: Why Congress Needs to Plug
the Loophole That Builds Up Dynastic Wealth,’’ CBS Money
Watch (Dec. 1, 2010), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/
8301-505123_162-41240676/estate-taxes-why-congress-needs-to-
plug-the-loophole-that-builds-up-dynastic-wealth/ (‘‘Two pro-
tected generations is enough’’).
24See Property Restatement, supra note 1, at section 27.1(a),
which provides that ‘‘if, upon the expiration of the [two-
generation] perpetuity period, the share of a beneficiary is
distributable upon reaching a specified age and the beneficiary
is then younger than the earlier of the specified age or the age of
30, the beneficiary’s share may, without judicial modification, be
retained in trust until the beneficiary reaches or dies before
reaching the earlier of the specified age or the age of 30.’’
25See Property Restatement, supra note 1, at section 27.1(b)(2),
which provides: ‘‘In the case of a trust or other property
COMMENTARY / SHELF PROJECT
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would be allowed to choose any one of the three
alternatives, but could not choose the last (or sec-
ond to last) of the three periods. (The settlor could,
however, choose the earliest to expire of two or
three of the alternative periods or some period that
expires even earlier.)
Each of the three periods has a basis in perpetuity
law.26 Allowing trust settlors the option of choosing
which of the three periods (but not the last of the
three or the later of two of the three) best suits the
terms of the trust would be consistent with the
original purpose of the GST exemption. Because all
three perpetuity periods represent reasonable ways
to limit deadhand control and are backed by the
Uniform Law Commission or the American Law
Institute,27 Congress should allow the settlor to
select the period that best fits the needs of the trust.
2. Existing trusts. For perpetual trusts that were
established before the effective date and therefore
have already qualified for the GST exemption, it
might be unconstitutional to deny the exemption
retroactively28 or to terminate the exemption on
enactment.29 But it would almost certainly be con-
stitutional to grant a post-enactment grace period,
say of six months or perhaps a year, during which
the terms of the trust could be modified to require
the trust to terminate within one of the three
perpetuity periods.30 Modification could be
achieved judicially under existing case law31 or
under statutory law that is already enacted or, if
necessary, could be promptly enacted. Or, modifi-
cation could be achieved privately by the exercise of
trustee or trust-protector powers.32 Any trust so
modified during the grace period would retain its
GST exemption. Any trust not so modified during
the grace period would lose its GST exemption on
arrangement for the sole current benefit of a named individual
who is more than two generations younger than the transferor
or more than the equivalent of two generations younger than
the transferor, the measuring life is the named individual.’’ As
explained in commentary, that provision ‘‘facilitates the estab-
lishment of a trust or other property arrangement for the sole
current benefit of a beneficiary such as a living great-
grandchild.’’ Id. at h. It may be desirable for Congress to allow
a trust for the current benefit of more than one great-grandchild.
26The life-in-being-plus-21-years period tracks the common
law rule against perpetuities and the Uniform Law Commis-
sion’s Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, section 1(a)(1)
(1986) (incorporated in the Uniform Probate Code as section
2-901(a)(1)). The 90-year period tracks the wait-and-see element
of the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, section 1(a)(2)
(1986) (incorporated in the Uniform Probate Code as section
2-901(a)(2)). The two-generation limit tracks the perpetuity rule
adopted by the American Law Institute. See Property Restate-
ment, supra note 1, at section 27.1. The Property Restatement
perpetuity rule does not produce a period that is materially
longer or shorter than the traditional common law period. Id.
Introductory Note to Chapter 27, at 570.
A somewhat similar two-generation approach was proposed
in 2005 by the JCT. See JCT, ‘‘Options to Improve Tax Compli-
ance and Reform Tax Expenditures,’’ JCS-02-05, at 393 (Jan. 27,
2005), Doc 2005-1714, 2005 TNT 18-18.
27The Uniform Law Commission (nccusl.org) and the Ameri-
can Law Institute (ali.org) are the two premier deliberative
bodies devoted to impartial law reform based on the public
interest.
28The constitutional question is whether retroactive tax leg-
islation violates the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution.
See U.S. Constitution amendment V (‘‘Nor [shall any person] be
deprived of . . . property, without due process of law’’). The
constitutional prohibition of ex post facto laws is irrelevant,
because it applies only to criminal matters.
The controlling due process decision on retroactive tax
legislation is United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26 (1994), Doc
94-5582, 94 TNT 114-1. In Carlton, the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of retroactive estate tax legislation to correct a
congressional mistake. In the key passage, the Court said: ‘‘The
due process standard is met simply by showing that the
retroactive application of the legislation is itself justified by a
rational legislative purpose.’’ Id. at 30-31. The Court also noted
that Congress acted promptly after discovering the mistake and
therefore established only a modest period of retroactivity and
that much immediate tax revenue was going to be lost if the
mistake was not corrected retroactively. Neither of those fea-
tures — prompt action nor immediate loss of substantial tax
revenue — is present in the case at hand, but it is unclear
whether either one is a requirement. Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor, concurring in the result, did say, however, that in her
view, ‘‘a period of retroactivity longer than the year preceding
the legislative session in which the law was enacted would
raise . . . serious constitutional questions.’’ Id. at 38.
29It might be constitutional to terminate the GST exemption
upon enactment (id.), but that approach seems to be harsh when
a less intrusive approach — the grace period approach advo-
cated by the Effective Solution — is more consistent with the
original purpose of the GST exemption, which was to allow
trusts whose initial value does not exceed the exemption ceiling
to be exempt from GST tax for the time allowed by state
perpetuity law.
30See supra notes 28 and 29. Requiring existing trusts to be
modified to satisfy new tax requirements is not unprecedented.
See sections 2055(e) and 2522(c).
31To facilitate modification under state law, Congress should
add a provision similar to section 2055(e) or section 2522(c) for
modification of split-interest charitable trusts. For state law
authority to modify trusts in the light of changes in tax law, see
supra note 20. See also Diana S. C. Zeydel and Jonathan G.
Blattmachr, ‘‘Tax Effects of Decanting — Obtaining and Preserv-
ing the Benefits,’’ 111 J. Tax’n 288 (Nov. 2009). The Property
Restatement’s perpetuity rule also calls for modification, provid-
ing: ‘‘Upon the petition of an interested person, the court shall
modify a disposition that [might extend beyond the perpetuity
limit]. . . . The form of the modification must be in a manner that
most closely approximates the transferor’s manifested plan of
distribution and is within the perpetuity limit.’’ See Property
Restatement, supra note 1, at section 27.2 (2011).
32A trustee or trust-protector power might take the form of a
decanting power, which is a power of appointment, typically a
non-general power, that enables the donee of the power to
create a new trust. Technically, any trust created after the
effective date by the exercise of a decanting power might be
regarded as a post-effective-date trust, but the GST exemption
would be preserved only if the perpetuity period runs from the
date when the original trust was created.
COMMENTARY / SHELF PROJECT
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expiration of the grace period.33 The GST tax would
then apply to any post-grace-period generation-
skipping transfer, whether it is a taxable termina-
tion, a taxable distribution, or a direct skip.
3. Adaptations to the Effective Solution proposal.
If Congress were to enact the Effective Solution,
what would be the reaction?
a. Pre-effective-date trusts. Perpetual trusts es-
tablished before the effective date likely would be
modified during the grace period to require them to
terminate within whichever of the three perpetuity
periods best suits the settlor’s purposes.34
b. Post-effective-date trusts. Perpetual trusts
would no longer be created after the effective date.
Trusts whose purpose is to remain exempt from
GST tax for as long as possible would be crafted to
terminate within whichever of the three perpetuity
periods best suits the settlor’s purposes.35
D. Tax Revenue
Neither the Effective Solution nor the Treasury
alternative would raise much present or future GST
tax revenue.36 But that was not the purpose of the
GST exemption. The purpose was to exempt trusts
whose initial value does not exceed the exemption
ceiling from the GST tax for the time allowed by
state perpetuity law, but no longer. On this score,
the Effective Solution is more aligned with the
original purpose of the GST exemption than the
Treasury alternative.
Congress should enact the Effective Solution
rather than the Treasury alternative. If it does,
existing and future trusts will terminate within the
time allowed by state perpetuity law. When the
trusts terminate, the beneficiaries will own their
shares outright and free of trust. Any transfer tax
revenue will arise from their future taxable trans-
fers. That’s exactly what Congress contemplated
when it adopted the GST exemption.
33If a perpetual trust were not modified during the grace
period, the GST exemption could be restored by modifying the
trust later, but the restoration would be effective only upon
modification.
34Termination on the expiration of the earliest to occur of the
three periods would be permissible under the Effective Solution.
35Id.
36The JCT estimated the revenue effects of the Treasury
proposal through 2022 to be ‘‘negligible.’’ JCT, ‘‘Estimated
Budget Effects of the Revenue Provisions Contained in the
President’s Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Proposal,’’ JCX-27-12, at 9
(Mar. 14, 2012), Doc 2012-5410, 2012 TNT 51-13.
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